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basis for its decision: that under the Rules of Decision Act2O the federal
courts must, at a given moment, apply the then controlling decision of the
highest state court. If this is true, what has happened to the doctrine of
the Gelpeke case,2 1 the so-called "contract exception," which is the rule in
many states as well as in the federal courts?22
Although the Court attempted in the instant case to resolve the con-
fusion in the federal cases, the opinion actually added to it by stating two
distinct grounds for the holding, since the choice of one or the other
rationale may impel opposite holdings in particular cases. A sounder view
would seem to be that a state's rule as to retrospective application of over-
ruling decisions is a part of its substantive law within the rule of the E ie
case and, as such, must be followed by the federal courts in diversity cases.
This view would be in harmony with the effort of the Court in the Erie
case to eliminate substantial disparities between the state courts and federal
courts sitting in matters governed by state law. M. D. C.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-AVOIDING FEDERAL JURISDICTION-ASSIGNMENT TO
PREVENT DIVERSITY OF CITIENHI-[Federal].-A policy of insurance was
issued by defendant company, an English corporation. For the sole purpose
of keeping an action on the policy in the Missouri courts, the heirs of the
beneficiary assigned their rights to plaintiff, a citizen of England and a
resident of Missouri. By the terms of the assignment, the assignee was to
file suit or othervise compromise the claim under the policy, receive any
money that might be paid on the claim, pay expenses incurred in the collec-
tion of the money, and hold the residue of any money thus received in trust
for the heirs. Suit was therefore filed in the state court, which granted
defendant's petition for removal to the federal court on the ground that
there was diversity of citizenship between the heirs and the corporation
and that the assignment was a sham to prevent removal. Plaintiff moved
to remand. Held: Motion granted. The practice of avoiding the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts by an assignment to prevent diversity of citizenship
is recognized and approved. Daldy v. The Ocean Accident and Guarantee
Corp.'
By the Judiciary Act of 1875,2 the federal courts are compelled to dis-
miss or remand a case if it appears that a colorable assignment or joinder
has been made for the purpose of giving them jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court has, however, established the general rule that a colorable assign-
ment for the purpose of keeping an action out of the federal courts may
20. 28 U. S. C. A. (1928) sec. 725: "Laws of States as rules of decision.
The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or
statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be re-
garded as rules of decisions in trials at common law, in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply."
21. See cases cited supra note 14.
22. See cases cited supra note 4.
1. (D. C. E. D. Mo. 1941) unreported.
2. Act of March 3, (1875) 18 Stat. 470, c. 137, 28 U. S. C. A. (1928)
sec. 80.
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not be questioned.3 The colorable nature of the assignment in the latter
situation cannot be pleaded in the federal court, but can only be shown as
a defense to the action in the state court. However, the overwhelming
weight of authority in the state courts allows the holder of the bare legal
title to bring an action under "real party in interest" statutes.4 The result
of the application of this state rule is that actions involving colorable assign-
ments are determined on their merits in the state court.
The instant case squarely overrules Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.
r. England,5 decided by the same judge in 1938. The court, in the Phoenix
case, attempted to engraft upon the general rule the dictum in Ex parte
Nebraska.6 The plaintiffs in the Nebraska case attempted to prevent re-
moval to the federal courts on the ground that the state of Nebraska had
been joined as a party plaintiff.7 It does not appear, however, whether the
joinder had been purposely made to prevent the jurisdiction of the federal
court from attaching. The Supreme Court, in that case, indicated that the
federal court must look behind appearances to discover interest or lack of
it on the part of the parties to the suit and thus determine the real parties
to the controversy.8 This dictum was based on the general rule that the
jurisdiction of the federal courts cannot be defeated by joining formal,
nominal, or uninterested parties. 9 On the strength of the dictum in the
Nebraska case concerning joinder, the court refused in the Phoenix case
to remand a case involving a colorable assignment.
Hence, if a colorable assignment is made to keep a cause in the state
court and the suit is brought in the state court, the cause is not removable
to the federal court. However, if the purpose of the colorable assignment
is to give the federal court jurisdiction, the federal court cannot take juris-
diction. If, on the other hand, an attempt is made to give jurisdiction to
3. Provident Saving Life Assur. Soc. v. Ford (1885) 114 U. S. 635;
Oakley v. Goodnow (1886) 118 U. S. 43; Leather Manufacturers' Natl
Bank v. Cooper (1887) 120 U. S. 778; Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.
(1931) 284 U. S. 183.
4. Bernblum v. Travelers Ins. Co. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 34;
See Clark, Code Pleading (1928) p. 102, n. 40, 43. It is the rule in the
majority of state courts that an assignee for collection only is the proper
party to bring a suit under the same statutes. See 2 Moore, Federal Prac-
tice Under the New Federal Rules 2051, see. 1708, n. 12.
5. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 284.
6. (1907) 209 U. S. 436.
7. A suit in which a state is a party cannot be removed on the grounds
of diverse citizenship. If the suit is one arising under the Constitution or
laws of the United States or treaties made under their authority, it is
removable even when the state is a party. U. S. Const. Amend. XI. See
Ames v. Kansas (1884) 111 U. S. 449; Stone v. South Carolina (1886) 117
U. S. 430; Postal Telegraph v. Alabama (1894) 155 U. S. 482; Chicago
R. I. and P. Ry. v. State of Nebraska (C. C. A. 8, 1918) 251 Fed. 279.
8. But the case was expressly decided on the ground that the remedy
was by appeal and not by mandamus. Ex parte Nebraska (1907) 209 U. S.
436, 437.
9. Walden v. Skinner (1879) 101 U. S. 577. See: Wilson v. Oswega
Twp. (1894) 151 U. S. 56; Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works (1903) 190
U. S. 428; Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co. (1924) 264
U. S. 182.
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the federal court or prevent the jurisdiction of the federal court from
attaching by way of joinder rather than by assignment, the federal court,
when called upon to hear a motion for removal from a state court, must
strike formal, nominal, colorable, and uninterested parties. The same result
follows when the action is first brought in the federal court. After striking,
the court will determine whether it must take jurisdiction. S. F.
MANDAMUS-ISSUANCE TO LEGISLATIVE OFFICER-NATURE OF SPEAKER'S
DUTY TO DECLARE ELECTION OF GoVERNoR-[Missouri] .- The Constitution
of Missouri provides that "The returns of every election" for governor
"shall be sealed up and transmitted by the returning officers to the Secretary
of State, directed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall,
immediately after the organization of the House, and before proceeding to
other business, open and publish the same in the presence of a majority of
each House of the General Assembly, * * *. The person having the highest
number of votes" for the office of governor "shall be declared duly elected;
* * *."I On the face of the returns of the election for governor in 1940,
relator received a plurality of the votes cast for the office. Immediately
after the organization of the House, the General Assembly, charging irreg-
ularity and fraud in the election, passed a resolution providing for an in-
vestigation. In accord with this resolution the speaker refused to open and
publish the returns and to declare the election of relator, pending an inquiry
into the legality of the votes. Relator sued for a writ of mandamus to
compel the speaker to act. Held, that mandamus must issue because the
Constitution of Missouri imposed a ministerial duty on the speaker, free
from legislative control, to open, publish, and declare the results of the
election. State ex rel. Donnell v. Osburn.2
Mandamus will ordinarily issue to compel the performance of a minis-
terial, 3 as distinguished from discretionary,4 duty. The writ will not issue
if the duty, though ministerial, rests upon the legislature,G or upon a legis-
1. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.
2. (Mo. 1941) 147 S. W. (2d) 1065.
3. State ex rel. Register of Lands v. Secretary of State (1863) 33 Mo.
293; Dreyfus v. Lonergan (1898) 73 Mo. App. 336; State ex rel. Schade v.
Russell (1908) 131 Mo. App. 638, 110 S. W. 667; Note (1935) 20 ST. Louis
LAW REVIEW 346, 355.
4. State ex rel. Best v. Jones (1900) 155 Mo. 570, 56 S. W. 307; State
ex rel. Clark v. West (1917) 272 Mo. 304, 198 S. W. 1111. Howeve4
mandamus will issue to compel the exercise of discretion though the court
will not substitute its judgment for that of the recalcitrant officer. State
ex rel. Gehrig v. Medley (1930) 28 S. W. (2d) 1040. Mandamus will also
issue to correct an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Kelleher v. Public
Schools (1896) 134 Mo. 296, 35 S. W. 617; State ex rel. Journal Printing
Co. v. Dreyer (1914) 183 Mo. App. 463, 167 S. W. 1123; State ex rel.
Farmers' Bank v. Township Board (1915) 188 Mo. App. 266, 175 S. W.
139; Comment (1940) 26 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 134.
5. Mandamus will not issue against the legislature because of the respect
accorded the co-ordinate branch and because of the unenforceability of
the writ against that body. The cases indicate that under no circumstances
will the writ lie. However, the decision might also be explained as concern-
ing discretionary duties. French v. State Senate (1905) 146 Cal. 604, 80
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